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Abstract Robert Hartman’s parallelism argument aims to show that resultant moral
luck exists. The gist of the argument is this: because there is circumstantial moral
luck in a particular circumstantial luck scenario and that scenario is analogous in
important ways to a particular resultant luck scenario, the resultant luck scenario is
plausibly an instance of resultant moral luck (and hence, resultant moral luck
exists). I argue that there is a principled way of denying that circumstantial moral
luck is present in the circumstantial luck scenario. Doing so is not enough, however,
to reject Hartman’s general analogical line of reasoning since an alternative par-
allelism argument based on a resultant luck scenario and a circumstantial luck
scenario of another kind can be made. Nevertheless, I argue that the analogy
between the circumstantial luck scenario and the resultant luck scenario in both the
alternative parallelism argument and its original counterpart is too weak to support
the claim that resultant moral luck is present in the resultant luck scenario.
Keywords Moral luck  Resultant moral luck  Circumstantial moral luck  Moral
responsibility  The parallelism argument  Blameworthiness  Robert Hartman
1 Introduction
Most philosophers writing on the problem of moral luck distinguish between at least
four varieties of luck—four ways in which luck affects agents’ actions, where
actions are considered affected by luck if they depend on factors beyond agents’
control. These are luck in how things turn out (resultant luck), in what opportunities
and challenges one faces (circumstantial luck), in what one is like (constitutive
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luck), and in how one is affected by past states of the world and the laws of nature
(causal luck).1
Where an agent’s moral blame- or praiseworthiness is partially determined by
luck—by factors beyond her control—there is moral luck.2 Such luck divides into
four categories, echoing the four ways in which luck affects agents’ actions. Thus,
resultant moral luck is present when an agent’s blame- or praiseworthiness is
partially determined by how her actions turn out, circumstantial moral luck is
present when an agent’s blame- or praiseworthiness is partially determined by what
opportunities and challenges she faces, and so on (assuming, of course, that it is
beyond the agent’s control how things turn out, what opportunities and challenges
she faces, and so on).
Our judgments about blame- and praiseworthiness in particular cases indicate
that we are committed to the existence of moral luck. We tend to think, for example,
that a reckless driver who hits a pedestrian is more blameworthy than an equally
reckless driver who does not (Nagel, 1979: 29). If she is, resultant moral luck exists.
After all, factors beyond the drivers’ control partially determine whether they hit a
pedestrian since whether they do depends on whether a pedestrian crosses their
paths.
We also tend to think, for example, that a judge who takes a bribe is more
blameworthy than her colleague who does not, but would have, had she gotten the
offer (Thomson, 1989: 214). If she is, circumstantial moral luck exists. After all,
factors beyond the judges’ control partially determine whether they take a bribe
since whether they do depends on whether someone offers them one.
The existence of various kinds of moral luck, however, is incompatible with a
widely accepted control principle, namely, that agents are blame- and praiseworthy
for something only to the extent that it depends on factors within their control. In his
seminal paper on the problem of moral luck, Thomas Nagel puts the principle this
way: ‘‘one cannot be more culpable or estimable for anything than one is for that
fraction of it which is under one’s control’’ (Nagel, 1979: 28). Our adherence to the
control principle and our judgments in particular cases thus give rise to a
contradiction. On the one hand, we seem committed to the idea that moral luck of
various kinds exists (which our particular judgments indicate). On the other, we
seem committed to the idea that moral luck does not exist (which our adherence to
the control principle indicates). This contradiction is what I take the problem of
moral luck to consist in.
Some philosophers attempt to solve the contradiction by firmly sticking to the
control principle and categorically denying the existence of moral luck (e.g., Levy,
2011; Zimmerman, 1987, 2002, 2015). Others try to account for both our adherence
to the control principle and the particular judgements by limiting the scope of the
1 The categorization is Thomas Nagel’s (1979: e.g., 28) although some of the labels have been coined by
others.
2 In his seminal paper on moral luck, Nagel phrases the definition in terms of how we treat agents rather
than in terms of what agents deserve (1979: 26). Since the philosophically interesting question is the




control principle and accepting some kinds of moral luck while denying other kinds
(e.g., Nelkin, 2019b; Peels, 2015; Rescher, 1990; Richards, 1986; Rivera-López,
2016; Thomson, 1989). But there is also a third solution: to entirely abandon the
control principle and accept all kinds of moral luck (e.g., Greco, 1995; Hartman,
2017). The existence of resultant moral luck, however, is contested by a large
majority of those writing on the subject—when reflecting on scenarios such as the
one with the reckless drivers while keeping the control principle in mind, many
retract the initial judgement that the agents differ in degree of blameworthiness.3 A
challenge for those who endorse the last type of solution is thus to show that
resultant moral luck indeed exists. Robert Hartman has recently put forward a new
argument to that effect. Roughly, he argues that we have good reasons to think that
resultant moral luck exists because circumstantial moral luck exists, and there are
important similarities between circumstantial luck scenarios and resultant luck
scenarios (Hartman, 2017: 105–107). Hartman’s so-called parallelism argument has
not, however, received sustained appraisal in the literature so far. The purpose of
this paper is to provide such an appraisal. More specifically, I will argue that the
argument does not hold up under scrutiny. I first introduce the argument and present
what I take to be an elucidating reconstruction of it (Sect. 2). I then make some
clarifications that will prove important (Sect. 3), look closer at the controversial
premises (Sects. 4, 5, 6) and end by emphasizing what conclusion to draw from the
discussion (Sect. 7).
2 Explicating the parallelism argument
The parallelism argument is based on pair of comparisons between three cases—call
the cases A, B and C. In each case, an assassin is hired to commit murder by
gunshot, and all assassins make plans and show up to kill their target. When they are
about to pull the trigger, however, their cases start to differ. When Anne, the
assassin in case A, is about to pull the trigger she suffers a sneezing fit due to
allergies acting up and, therefore, does not pull the trigger. Had her allergies not
acted up, she would have pulled the trigger. Beth, the assassin in case B, also has
allergies but they do not act up. Beth thus gets an opportunity to pull the trigger and
pulls it, but her bullet does not hit the target since a passing bird intercepts it.
Finally, Claire, the assassin in case C, gets an opportunity to pull the trigger and her
bullet hits home, killing the target on the spot (Hartman, 2017: 106).4
The first comparison is between cases A and B (call this comparison ‘‘AB’’). In
AB, there is circumstantial luck: due to factors beyond the agents’ control (their
allergies acting up or not), they face different opportunities and, therefore, perform
different actions. Thus, there is potentially circumstantial moral luck in AB (since
3 See Hartman (2017: 129) for an inventory of the published opinions on the existence of resultant moral
luck.
4 Hartman calls the assassins Sneezy, Off-Target, and Bulls-Eye. For a reminder of which case and
comparison each agent belongs to I have renamed the assassins Anne (case A), Beth (case B), and Claire
(case C).
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Beth is potentially more blameworthy than Anne). The second comparison is
between cases B and C (call this comparison ‘‘BC’’) and in it, there is resultant luck:
due to factors beyond the agents’ control—a passing bird intercepting the bullet or
not—they bring about different states of affairs even though they perform actions
that are exactly alike. Hence, there is potentially resultant moral luck in BC (since
Claire is potentially more blameworthy than Beth) (Hartman, 2017: 106).
With the stage thus set, the gist of the argument can be sketched. Hartman (2017:
106–107) argues that there are three similarities between AB and BC. These are
that:
(i) the two agents in each comparison have identical agency in some sense and
are distinguished at least partially by luck (call this similarity ‘‘Identical
Agency’’),
(ii) the two agents in AB have very similar actual mental states to the two
agents in BC (call it ‘‘Similar Mental States’’), and
(iii) in each comparison, the two agents bring about morally significant events
voluntarily (call it ‘‘Voluntariness’’).
If AB and BC are analogous in these ways, and if there is circumstantial moral luck
in AB, then we can conclude by analogy, Hartman continues, that there is plausibly
resultant moral luck in BC. Hence, resultant moral luck exists.
In more detail, and with the implicit steps made explicit, the parallelism
argument runs as follows:
P1. Circumstantial moral luck exists.
P2. If circumstantial moral luck exists, then there is circumstantial moral luck in
AB.
C1. There is circumstantial moral luck in AB.
P3. AB and BC have at least the following three similarities: (i) Identical Agency,
(ii) Similar Mental States, and (iii) Voluntariness.
P4. If C1 and P3, then there is resultant moral luck in BC.
C2. There is resultant moral luck in BC.
P5. If C2, then resultant moral luck exists.
C3. Resultant moral luck exists.
A few words about the reconstruction are in order. First, Hartman presents the
parallelism argument as an inductive argument from analogy, and although my
reconstruction is deductively valid it does not contain any claims that Hartman is
not already committed to; P4 is not intended to express the idea that the truth of the
antecedent (logically or otherwise) guarantees the truth of the consequent. Rather,
P4 expresses a material implication—one that Hartman must accept in light of the
analogy he presses.5 Second, in my reconstruction, the parallelism argument’s
conclusion is the categorical claim that resultant moral luck exists. But there is also
5 An anonymous referee points out that there is an alternative reading of Hartman’s argument that does
not commit him to P4, but rather to P4*: If C1 and P3, then there is good evidence that there is resultant
moral luck in BC. Nothing hinges on whether P4 is put one way or the other since the argument against
the acceptance of P4 that I will present has force against both claims.
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another reading of the argument—one where the conclusion is the conditional claim
that resultant moral luck exists if circumstantial moral luck exists. With due
modifications, the criticism that I put forward in this paper holds for the conditional
version of the argument as well.
Moving on: P5 is uncontentious, and I will grant P1. I do so not merely for the
sake of argument, but also because it allows for the possibility to reject the
parallelism argument without implying that one kind of proposed solution to the
problem of moral luck—one that denies only resultant moral luck—is false. My
focus will thus be on P2, P3 and P4. While I believe we ought to accept P3, I will
argue that there is a principled way to reject P2 and that there are substantial reasons
not to accept P4.
3 Clarifying premise three
I believe we ought to accept P3 but as Hartman’s treatment of the similarities in it is
brief, we must spend some time clarifying them to properly engage with the rest of
the argument. Here, I thus offer some clarificatory remarks on each similarity to set
the stage for the discussion of P2 and P4.
Let us start with the first similarity, Identical Agency: the two agents in each
comparison have identical agency in some sense and are at least partially
distinguished by luck (Hartman, 2017: 106). Usually, and roughly, ‘‘agency’’ refers
to the exercise of an agent’s capacity to perform actions (Schlosser, 2019).
According to Hartman (2017: 106), the agents in AB have ‘‘subjunctively identical
agency’’ since Anne would have taken the shot just like Beth did, had Anne been in
Beth’s circumstances, and the agents in BC have ‘‘actually identical agency’’ since
they both actually take the shot in exactly similar circumstances.6 If Hartman uses
‘‘agency’’ orthodoxly he is thus saying that, because Anne would have exercised her
capacity to take the shot in circumstances exactly similar to Beth’s, Anne and Beth
have identical subjunctive agency. And, because Beth and Claire do exercise their
capacity to perform exactly similar actions in exactly similar circumstances, Beth
and Claire have identical actual agency (Beth and Claire also have identical
subjunctive agency since that is entailed by identical actual agency). This is what I
take Hartman to mean when he says that the two agents in each comparison have
identical agency in some sense. It is noteworthy, however, that given this the
description of an action cannot include results. If it does, Beth and Claire do not
have identical actual agency since Claire, but not Beth, causes the death of the
target. This will prove important later on.
The second similarity, Similar Mental States, says that the two agents in AB have
very similar actual mental states to the two agents in BC (Hartman, 2017: 106).
What are the relevant actual mental states here? Anne and Beth both desire and
intend to kill the target. They also have the following beliefs: that they have the
skills to kill the target, that they will get an opportunity to pull the trigger, and that
6 Italics in original.
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they will cause the death of the target. Since Claire also have these actual mental
states, both agents in BC have them too. It seems the only potentially relevant way
that the actual mental states of the two agents in BC differ from the actual mental
states of the two agents in AB is with regard to their willings: in BC both agents will
themselves to pull the trigger, which both agents in AB do not do.
The final similarity, Voluntariness, is that ‘‘the agents in both case pairs […]
bring about morally significant events voluntarily’’ (Hartman, 2017: 107). It is clear
what morally significant events Beth and Claire voluntarily bring about: a serious
threat to the target’s life and the death of the target, respectively. Less clear is what
event Anne brings about voluntarily. What Hartman has in mind is perhaps that, just
like Beth, she voluntarily brings about, at least for a time, a lethal threat to the
target, or perhaps that she earlier brought about morally significant events by acting
in certain ways with the intention of performing the assassination. The fact that
Hartman does not specify what event Anne brings about voluntarily, along with
what he says in his (brief) description of the similarity, seems to indicate, however,
that he is really after something else. Here is the full description of the similarity:
‘‘the event of taking the shot and the event of killing the mark both depend on the
agency of the relevant person. In [AB], the mere assassination attempt depends on
[Beth’s] voluntarily choice, and, in [BC], the successful assassination depends on
[Claire’s] voluntary choice’’ (Hartman, 2017: 106–107). If the important events are
the ones Beth and Claire voluntarily bring about, I believe the similarity should be
stated in terms of them. Here is my suggestion:
(iii) in each comparison, the agent who brings about the morally worse event
does so voluntarily (call it ‘‘Voluntariness’’).
Moving forward, I assume that this is what Hartman has in mind.
With these points in place, let us turn to what I take to be the problematic
premises.
4 Rejecting premise two
The parallelism argument’s second premise says that if circumstantial moral luck
exists, then there is circumstantial moral luck in AB (Hartman, 2017: 107). It does
not follow, however, from the existence of circumstantial moral luck that it is
present in all circumstantial luck scenarios. Therefore, circumstantial moral luck
might not be present in AB even if it exists. Dana K. Nelkin raises this objection but
does not much explore it (2019a). I believe, however, that it is a serious worry that
warrants further consideration.
Now, if one holds that there is no circumstantial moral luck in circumstantial luck
scenarios like the one Anne and Beth find themselves in, yet grants that
circumstantial moral luck exists (which I have done), there must be circumstantial
luck scenarios of some other kind in which circumstantial moral luck is present. A
challenge thus arises, namely, to show in a principled way why there is no
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circumstantial moral luck in scenarios like the one Anne and Beth find themselves
in even if there is circumstantial moral luck in other circumstantial luck scenarios.
I believe the challenge can be met by distinguishing circumstantial luck scenarios
where the agents’ mental states are similar from those where they are not. Consider
scenarios like the one Anne and Beth find themselves in. In these, the relevant
mental states of the agents are very similar: Anne and Beth have the same desire and
intention, and they share many relevant beliefs. But there are circumstantial luck
scenarios in which the agents’ mental states differ significantly. This is so, for
example, in the following case (call it ‘‘Expatriation’’): Expatriate and Collaborator
are inhabitants of Germany before the Nazi ascent. Expatriate’s employer transfers
her to Argentina in 1930, while Collaborator’s employer keeps her in the country.
Collaborator goes on to adopt the Nazi ideology and perform wrongful actions in
accordance with it. Expatriate, however, goes on to lead a morally exemplary life in
Argentina. Had Expatriate not been transferred, she would have adopted the Nazi
ideology and performed wrongful actions in accordance with it, just like
Collaborator.7
Expatriate never desires or intends to perform wrongful actions that conform to
the Nazi ideology, and she never believes that she will. Collaborator, by contrast,
does all these things. This type of circumstantial luck scenario is thus structurally
different from the type that Anne and Beth are in: both agents in AB desire and
intend to perform wrongful actions and at some point believe that they can and will,
while only one agent in Expatriation does. This structural difference allows us to
deny, in a principled way, that there is circumstantial moral luck in AB even if
circumstantial moral luck exists. It allows us to argue, on the one hand, that it is
implausible that moral luck is present in scenarios of the AB kind because it is
counterintuitive that agents like Anne and Beth differ in degree of blameworthiness
since their mental states are relevantly similar. And it allows us to argue, on the
other hand, that it is not implausible that there is moral luck in circumstantial luck
scenarios of the Expatriation kind because it is not counterintuitive that agents like
Expatriate and Collaborator differ in degree of blameworthiness since their mental
states are relevantly different.8
However, Hartman (2017: 15–16, 109–110) argues that an adequate reply to the
parallelism argument cannot appeal to standard anti-moral luck intuitions because
7 The outline of this case is from Nagel (1979: 26). Details have been fleshed out by, e.g., Nelkin (2019a)
and Hartman (2017).
8 Note that there is nothing dialectically strange about making this kind of distinction; anyone who
accepts the existence of circumstantial moral luck must make it since it is implausible that circumstantial
luck always affects blameworthiness. Hartman (2017: 93) himself, for example, distinguishes between
circumstantial luck scenarios where the circumstantial feature fully or partially damages the agent’s
capacity to exercise moral agency, and those where it does not. According to him the latter, but not the
former, is of the kind where moral luck is present.
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the argument’s premises do not rely on standard pro-moral luck intuitions.9 In that
case, rejecting P2 by appealing to intuition might seem objectionable. I believe it is
not, however. When Hartman (2017: 95–103) argues for the existence of
circumstantial moral luck, he does so from certain considerations in epistemology
(what they are is irrelevant for my purposes). Let us grant that his argument for the
existence of circumstantial moral luck does not appeal to pro-moral luck intuitions.
Even so, Hartman has not argued that there is circumstantial moral luck in AB
without appealing to such intuition since it does not follow from the existence of
circumstantial moral luck that it is present in AB. As things stand, he therefore
cannot dismiss an objection to P2 simply by pointing out that it is intuition-based.
A more serious worry is that the parallelism argument can be restated in terms of
a pair of comparisons where the agents find themselves in scenarios of the
Expatriation kind. Consider Dana, Emma, and Fiona, who are all inhabitants of
Germany before the Nazi ascent. Dana’s employer transfers her to Argentina in
1930. Emma’s and Fiona’s employers, on the other hand, do not transfer them
anywhere. Dana goes on to live a morally exemplary life in Argentina while Emma
and Fiona become Nazi collaborators. At one point, Emma happens upon an
escaped, innocent prisoner and decides to kill the prisoner for fun. She takes perfect
aim and pulls the trigger of her gun, but the bullet does not hit home because a bird
intercepts it. Had Dana not been transferred to Argentina, she would have become a
collaborator and taken a shot for fun at an escaped prisoner just like Emma does.
Fiona, finally, happens upon an innocent escaped prisoner as well. She also decides
to kill the prisoner for fun, takes perfect aim and pulls the trigger, killing the
prisoner on the spot.
The two comparisons here are between the cases of Dana and Emma (DE) and
between the cases of Emma and Fiona (EF). A parallelism argument based on this
pair of comparisons (call it ‘‘the alternative parallelism argument’’) would look like
the original except that its third premise would state that DE and EF are similar in
two, rather than three, respects—and P4 would be adapted accordingly. After all, the
agents in DE do not have very similar actual mental states to the agents in EF: Dana
never desires to, intends to, or believe that she will, kill the prisoner for fun. DE and
EF are similar, however, in the other two respects that AB and BC are similar: the
two agents in each comparison have identical agency in some sense and are at least
partially distinguished by luck, and in each comparison, the agent who brings about
the morally worse event does so voluntarily.
Thus, Hartman’s general line of reasoning cannot be dismissed even if we reject
premise two. Note, however, that the analogy in the alternative parallelism
argument is weaker than its original counterpart since the comparisons it is based on
are similar in only two respects. That the analogy could become weaker with a
9 Hartman’s point is not that we cannot in general appeal to a type of consideration when criticizing an
argument just because the argument does not rely on that type of consideration. Rather, he takes it that the
problem of moral luck is at its core a clash of (equally legitimate) intuitions and that we need arguments
that do not bottom out in the standard case intuitions to make progress in the debate. He presents the
parallelism argument as such an argument and therefore holds that a reply to it is adequate only if it lives
up to the same dialectical standard.
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different set of cases is noted by Nelkin (2019a). Although she does not elaborate, I
will argue (in Sect. 5) that this is a serious flaw because the two remaining
similarities do not seem sufficient, together with the fact that there is circumstantial
moral luck in DE, to make it plausible that there is resultant moral luck in EF. In
other words, I will argue that P4 of the alternative parallelism argument is
implausible.
I want to remain agnostic, however, on whether there is circumstantial moral luck
in AB as intuitions on the matter are bound to differ. Moving forward, I thus
consider P4 of both the alternative and the original parallelism argument. My
overall point is that Hartman’s line of reasoning fails regardless of whether there is
circumstantial moral luck in AB because we have good reasons not to accept P4 of
both the alternative parallelism argument and P4 of its original counterpart. Over the
next two sections I make my case, taking as a starting point the original version.
5 Premise four: the similarities
The (original) parallelism argument’s P4 says that if AB and BC are similar in at
least the three observed ways and, in addition, there is circumstantial moral luck in
AB, then there is resultant moral luck in BC (Hartman, 2017: 107). We should
accept this premise if the analogy is strong enough to provide evidence for the claim
that there is resultant moral luck in BC. Whether it is, hinges on the extent to which
the three similarities are relevant to there being resultant moral luck in BC and
whether there are relevant dissimilarities between the two comparisons. This section
sets out to explore the extent to which the similarities provide evidence for the
presence of resultant moral luck in BC, and the next deals with what I take to be
some relevant dissimilarities that undermine the analogy.
So: how do the three observed similarities and the additional fact that there is
circumstantial moral luck in AB provide evidence that there is resultant moral luck
in BC? Hartman does not say anything to answer that question, and it is not obvious
how it is supposed to work.
First, consider Identical Agency (that the two agents in each comparison have
identical agency in some sense and are at least partially distinguished by luck) and
Similar Mental States (that the two agents in AB have very similar relevant actual
mental states to the two agents in BC). These similarities are perhaps supposed to
support the claim that there is resultant moral luck in BC by mitigating the force of
the intuition that Beth and Claire must be equally blameworthy. Here is how it
would work. One might intuit that Beth and Claire cannot be blameworthy to
different degrees (i.e., that resultant moral luck cannot be present in BC) because
Beth and Claire have identical agency and because both have certain actual mental
states. The force of that intuition is mitigated, one could argue, when it is pointed
out that Anne and Beth are blameworthy to different degrees (i.e., that
circumstantial moral luck is present in AB) yet they too have identical agency in
some sense and they too have these specific actual mental states. Thus, the force of
the intuition that Beth and Claire cannot be blameworthy to different degrees (i.e.,
that resultant moral luck cannot be present in BC) because they have identical
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agency and share the mental states that they do, is mitigated by pointing out these
two similarities between AB and BC.
It seems the second similarity, Similar Mental States, can fulfil this mitigating
role. After all, if Anne and Beth are blameworthy to different degrees despite both
of them desiring and intending to, and at some point believing that they can, and
will, kill the target, then the fact that Beth and Claire both desire and intend to, and
at some point believe that they can, and will, kill the target, is not a reason to
consider them blameworthy to the same degree.10
It seems to me, however, that the first similarity, Identical Agency, does not
support that Beth and Claire are blameworthy to different degrees by mitigating the
force of an intuition in this way. If there is resultant moral luck in BC, then Beth and
Claire would be blameworthy to different degrees while having identical actual
agency. Anne and Beth, however, are blameworthy to different degrees while
having identical subjunctive—not actual—agency. In other words, the kind of
agency that Anne and Beth share is different from the kind of agency that Beth and
Claire share. Thus, the force of the intuition that Beth and Claire must be
blameworthy to the same degree (i.e. that there is no is resultant moral luck in BC)
is not mitigated by pointing to the fact that Anne and Beth are blameworthy to
different degrees (i.e. there is circumstantial moral luck in AB) while having
identical agency too. Given this crucial difference between the kind of agency the
agents in each comparison share, Identical Agency does not, even together with the
other similarities and the fact that there is circumstantial moral luck in AB, seem to
provide any evidence that there is resultant moral luck in BC.
What about the final similarity, Voluntariness? It says that in each comparison,
the agent who brings about the morally worse event does so voluntarily. Hartman
does not elaborate on how the similarity provides evidence for the presence of
resultant moral luck in BC, and it cannot support there being resultant moral luck in
BC in the way Similar Mental States does. One straightforward possibility is that the
thing that in itself makes Beth more blameworthy than Anne is that she voluntarily
brings about a morally worse event than Anne does. If Beth is more blameworthy
than Anne because she voluntarily brings about a morally worse event than Anne
voluntary does (a more serious threat to the target’s life), then the fact that Claire
also voluntarily brings about a morally worse event than Beth voluntarily does (the
death of the target rather than a serious threat to the target’s life) supports the
conclusion that Claire is more blameworthy than Beth. However, the morally worse
event is the result of Beth’s action. Hence, if we say that Beth is more blameworthy
than Anne because she brings about a morally worse event than Anne, we are saying
that Beth is more blameworthy than Anne because her action had a different
(morally worse) result. That is, we are saying that an action’s result can affect an
agent’s degree of blameworthiness (i.e., that resultant moral luck exists). But any
10 Note that one cannot resist the analogy here by pointing out that while Anne and Beth have similar
relevant actual mental states, Beth and Claire have identical relevant actual mental states. That is perhaps
a relevant dissimilarity between the comparisons, but it does not change the fact that Similar Mental




appeal to that claim is dialectically illegitimate in this context, as it is precisely the
claim at issue.
One might object that we need not simply assume that results can affect
blameworthiness. Rather, we could say that it is intuitively plausible that an agent
who voluntarily brings about a morally worse event than another is more
blameworthy, and that what makes her more blameworthy is precisely that she
brings about a morally worse event voluntarily. It would thus be intuitively
plausible that Beth is more blameworthy than Anne because Beth voluntarily brings
about a morally worse event, and that Claire is more blameworthy than Beth
because Claire voluntarily brings about a morally worse event. But in that case, the
analogy does no work in establishing that there is resultant moral luck in BC; the
parallelism argument would be redundant as one could go directly from that
intuition to there being resultant moral luck in BC. (Alternatively, instead of
appealing to a principle-level intuition, one could appeal to a case intuition and say
that it is intuitively plausible that, in AB, Beth is more blameworthy than Anne
because she brings about a morally worse event. But in that case too, the parallelism
argument becomes redundant.)
Unless there is some other way in which Voluntariness supports the existence of
resultant moral luck in BC—and I cannot see what it would be—it seems that the
similarity does not provide any support for the claim that there is resultant moral
luck in BC, even when taken together with Identical Agency, Similar Mental States,
and the fact that there is circumstantial moral luck in AB.
Thus far, I have argued that out of the similarities Identical Agency, Similar
Mental States, and Voluntariness, it is only Similar Mental States—that the two
agents in AB have very similar relevant actual mental states to the two agents in
BC—that in conjunction with the fact that there is circumstantial moral luck in AB
provides any evidence that there is resultant moral luck in BC. What does this imply
for P4 of the original parallelism argument? The premise says that the three
similarities and the fact that there is circumstantial moral luck in AB are sufficient to
make it plausible that there is resultant moral luck in BC. That does not rule out,
however, that a smaller number of similarities can play the same role. It could thus
be that the remaining similarity is enough (together with the fact that there is
circumstantial moral luck in AB) to make it plausible that resultant moral luck is
present in BC.
Now, one relevant similarity does not make for a strong analogy. The fact that
Similar Mental States mitigates the force of the intuition that there is no resultant
moral luck in BC does not alone provide enough evidence to conclude that there is
resultant moral luck in BC. Consequently, if my case is convincing thus far, I
believe we have good reasons not to accept P4. And I will argue that the reasons get
stronger as we consider the relevant differences in the next section. But before
moving on, let us take stock of what the discussion so far implies for the alternative
parallelism argument.
The alternative parallelism argument works just like the original one but is based
on a pair of comparisons, DE and EF, where the mental states of the two agents in
one comparison are not very similar to the mental states of the two agents in the
other comparison. Its fourth premise would say that it is plausible that there is
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resultant moral luck in EF because DE and EF are similar in at least two respects
and because, in addition, there is circumstantial moral luck in DE. The two
similarities, however, would be that the two agents in each comparison have
identical agency in some sense and that in each comparison, the agent who brings
about the morally worse event does so voluntarily—in other words, precisely the
two similarities that have turned out not to provide any evidence for the claim that
there is resultant moral luck in the resultant luck scenario. Thus, the alternative
parallelism argument’s P4 should be rejected because the two similarities it
invokes—Identical Agency and Voluntariness—do not, even in conjunction with the
claim that there is circumstantial moral luck in DE, make it plausible that there is
resultant moral luck in EF. We need not look further, then, to conclude that the
alternative parallelism argument fails.
6 Premise four: the dissimilarities
Since it seems that only the second similarity, Similar Mental States, provides some
evidence that there is resultant moral luck in BC, the analogy appears substantially
weakened. I believe, in addition, that the comparisons differ in ways that further
undermine the analogy. More precisely, I will argue that the comparisons differ in
three ways which provide substantial evidence against P4 of the original parallelism
argument. These are that: (iv) the two agents in AB, unlike the two agents in BC,
actually perform different free actions (6.1), (v), the two agents in AB, unlike the
two agents in BC, have different willings (6.2), and (vi) the two agents in BC, unlike
the two agents in AB, are distinguished by luck alone (6.3).
6.1 Actual free action
Hartman considers and rejects an objection based on dissimilarity (iv), namely, that
while Anne and Beth do not actually, freely perform identical actions, Beth and
Claire do. He puts the objection in terms of a supervenience principle where degree
of blameworthiness supervenes on actual, free action.11 I do not think that is the best
way to put it, however, because it seems a stronger claim than necessary.
Rather, I suggest the dissimilarity can be turned into an objection in the following
way: if it is plausible that what makes Beth more blameworthy than Anne is that she
(actually, freely) performs a different, morally worse, action than Anne, then the
fact that Anne and Beth differ in degree of blameworthiness (i.e. that there is
circumstantial moral luck in AB) does not provide any evidence that Claire is more
blameworthy than Beth (i.e. that there is resultant moral luck in BC). After all, this
particular explanation for why Beth is more blameworthy than Anne cannot apply to
BC since Claire does not actually, freely perform a morally worse action than Beth.
If Beth and Claire differ in degree of blameworthiness then what would make them
blameworthy to different degrees is not that they perform different actions, but that
11 See Hartman (2017: 109) for the original formulation.
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Claire causes a morally worse event than Beth.12 That speaks against P4 because it
indicates that Anne and Beth’s being blameworthy to different degrees does not lend
any support to the claim that Beth and Claire differ in degree of blameworthiness,
even when combined with the fact that there are certain relevant similarities
between AB and BC.
Of course, this does not rule out that Beth and Claire are blameworthy to different
degrees since they cause different events, but my aim is not to give a direct
argument against the presence of resultant moral luck in BC. My point is rather that,
because the explanations of what would make the two agents in each comparison
blameworthy to different degrees differ, we have reasons to doubt that the three
observed similarities between AB and BC, together with the fact that there is
circumstantial moral luck in AB, make it plausible that there is resultant moral luck
in BC. And while this is not evidence against the presence of resultant moral luck in
BC, it is evidence against P4.
6.2 Willings
Dissimilarity (v)—that the agents in BC have identical willings but the agents in AB
do not—can be drawn from an argument by Andrew Khoury concerning what the
proper objects of blame- and praiseworthiness are. He argues that agents can be
blameworthy only for their inner willings (Khoury, 2018: 1358).13 On this view, two
agents cannot differ in degree of blameworthiness if they do not differ in their
willings and hence, it is relevant that the agents in AB have different willings (Beth
wills herself to pull the trigger but Anne does not) while the agents in BC have
identical willings (Beth and Claire both will themselves to pull the trigger). That
Anne and Beth differ in this way provides evidence against P4 because it shows that
the fact that Anne and Beth differ in degree of blameworthiness is not a reason to
consider Beth and Claire blameworthy to different degrees even if AB and BC are
similar in the three observed ways.
Two things are worth clarifying here. First, one might suspect that this is
ultimately the same dissimilarity as (iv) because it might seem like an agent cannot
will herself to perform an action unless she also performs that action. But she can.
Consider the following case: ‘‘Lee is an assassin who reasonably believes that he
has placed himself near a window on the fifth story of a building overlooking Elm
Street. He reasonably believes that he carefully and skilfully draws a bead on his
target. He reasonably believes that he pulls the trigger […]’’ (Khoury, 2018:
12 Recall that Hartman presupposes that consequences do not affect what action an agent has performed
when claiming that Beth and Claire have identical actual agency (see Sect. 3), such that Claire cannot be
said to perform a morally worse action than Beth in the way Beth can be said to perform a morally worse
action than Anne.
13 Some might find willings metaphysically suspicious. Khoury conceives of willings as the mental
events that are left after all contingent results have been stripped from an action. On this understanding,
he argues, their existence should be uncontroversial (see p. 1364).
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1360).14 It seems plausible that Lee wills himself to pull the trigger here. The case
has a twist, however. Unbeknownst to Lee, he has ‘‘recently had his brain removed
from his skull, placed in a vat of liquid, and hooked up to a computer which
simulates the external environment’’ (ibid.). So, Lee wills himself to pull the trigger
but fails to do so because he no longer has a body. If one can will oneself to act, yet
fail to act, willing and acting are two different matters. Hence, we have two
dissimilarities here, not one.
Second, one might suspect that this dissimilarity is irrelevant unless one shares
Khoury’s view that we are blameworthy for our willings only. That is not the case,
however, since the same reasoning used to make an objection out of (iv) can be
applied here too. That is to say, if it is plausible that what makes Beth more
blameworthy than Anne is that Beth wills herself to perform a different (morally
worse) action than Anne does, then the fact that Anne and Beth differ in degree of
blameworthiness would not provide any evidence for the claim that Claire is more
blameworthy than Beth. After all, this particular explanation for why Anne and Beth
differ in degree of blameworthiness cannot apply to BC, since Beth and Clare have
identical willings. That speaks against P4 because it indicates that Anne and Beth’s
being blameworthy to different degrees is no evidence that Beth and Claire differ in
degree of blameworthiness, even when combined with the fact that there are certain
relevant similarities between AB and BC.
Again, this would not rule out that Beth and Claire are blameworthy to different
degrees because they cause different events. And again, pointing that out would not
take the edge off the criticism since I am not arguing directly against the presence of
resultant moral luck in BC. I am simply trying to show that the fact that AB and BC
are similar in the three observed ways and that there is circumstantial moral luck in
BC is not enough to make it plausible that there is resultant moral luck in BC.
6.3 Luck
There is also, I believe, a third relevant dissimilarity between the comparisons: (vi)
the two agents in BC, unlike the two agents in AB, are distinguished by luck alone.
To see this, consider BC to begin with. In BC, the agents have the same desire and
intention, they both believe that they can and will kill the target, they both get an
opportunity to take the shot and take it—reasonably expecting that the bullet will hit
home. The only thing that distinguishes Beth’s case from Claire’s is that a bird
intercepts Beth’s bullet, but not Claire’s—in other words, the only thing that
distinguishes the two agents’ cases is a matter of luck. Now consider AB. Granted,
Anne and Beth are distinguished by luck because they are distinguished by the fact
that Beth, but not Anne, gets an opportunity to pull the trigger. But there is also a
further difference between them: Beth pulls the trigger, while Anne does not. That
Beth gets an opportunity to pull the trigger is a matter of luck; that she pulls the
trigger once she has gotten the opportunity is not. And while it seems
counterintuitive that two agents who are distinguished by luck alone are
14 Khoury uses the case to make a different point.
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blameworthy to different degrees, it does not seem counterintuitive (or at least less
counterintuitive) that two agents who are distinguished only partly by luck are
blameworthy to different degrees. Therefore, the presence of resultant moral luck in
BC is not made plausible by the presence of circumstantial moral luck in AB even if
AB and BC are similar in the three observed respects. Thus, (vi) is yet another factor
that speaks against P4.
One might want to insist that if we recall that Anne, given the opportunity, would
have pulled the trigger just like Beth and if we keep that fact firmly in mind, then we
can see that the difference between Anne and Beth is also due to luck alone, after
all. The truth of the counterfactual claim that Anne would have pulled the trigger
given the opportunity does not show, however, that it is a matter of luck whether
Beth pulls the trigger—it does not show that Beth does not control whether to pull
the trigger. Remember that I do not deny that the difference between Anne and Beth
is due partly (or even mostly) to luck but only that it is due to luck alone.
Concerning P4, I have in sum argued that only one of the three similarities
between AB and BC that Hartman brings attention to, together with the claim that
there is circumstantial moral luck in AB, provides evidence for the claim that
resultant moral luck is present in BC. In addition, I have argued that the
comparisons differ in three ways which undermine the analogy. Taken together,
these considerations make up a good case against the acceptance of P4 since it
seems the analogy is too weak to provide evidence that there is resultant moral luck
in BC. Undoubtedly, this objection is not conclusive, and proponents of the
parallelism argument may weigh the various similarities and dissimilarities
differently. Nevertheless, I believe I have at least provided the agnostic inquirer
with good reasons not to accept P4.
7 Concluding remarks
The parallelism argument says that resultant moral luck exists because circum-
stantial moral luck exists and there are strong parallels between a specific resultant
luck scenario (‘‘BC’’) and a circumstantial luck scenario (‘‘AB’’) in which there is
also circumstantial moral luck. The argument promises to show that resultant moral
luck exists and thereby promises to provide some justification for the current
practice, called into question by the denial of resultant moral luck, of blaming and
punishing agents that are successful in their morally bad endeavors more harshly
than those who are unsuccessful. In addition, since the argument has a conditional
reading, it promises to show that the most common position on resultant moral luck
in the philosophical debate (to deny its existence) is untenable unless one also
denies circumstantial moral luck—a commitment far fewer seem willing to take on.
I have argued that the argument fails even if the existence of circumstantial moral
luck is granted. Specifically, I have argued that there is a principled way to reject the
claim that there is circumstantial moral luck in AB, although I have remained
agnostic as to whether we ought to. Rejecting this claim is not enough though, I
have further argued, to show that Hartman’s general line of reasoning fails since an
alternative parallelism argument can be made. Nevertheless, I have, finally, argued
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that the parallels between the scenario in which there is circumstantial moral luck
and the resultant luck scenario are not strong enough to make it plausible that there
is resultant moral luck in the resultant luck scenario, and that this goes for both the
alternative parallelism argument and its original counterpart. Differently put, I have
argued that the analogy between the circumstantial luck scenario and the resultant
luck scenario is too weak to give us reason to accept that there is resultant moral
luck in the resultant luck scenario. The conclusion to draw from my criticism is not
that resultant moral luck does not exist, but that Hartman’s parallelism argument
fails to show that it does. As the conditional reading of his argument is vulnerable to
the same criticism (with due modifications), Hartman’s parallelism argument does
not live up to its promises.
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